THE GREEN ROOM (Episode 11): Amelia Clarke on Collaboration not Competition (Building Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainability)

World Environment Day, 2020: Building Resilient Health Structure to Combat Novel Diseases: A Case of COVID-19. A discussion with Jeffrey Sachs Moderated by Jason J. McSparren

The Virtual Symposium hosted over 25 renowned sustainability leaders, environmentalists, researchers, specialists on health, botanic conservation, resource management sustainable agriculture and building from around the world. Speaker such as Jeffrey Sachs, Adenike Akinsemolu, Marc Rosen, amongst others share their insights on our path towards sustainable development.

See my discussion with Jeffrey Sachs from 5 June 2020:

The Green Room: Episode 1: Is the Extractive Industry a Burden or Opportunity for Sustainable Development?


The discussion kicked off with a brief introduction of our distinguished speaker, Professor Damilola Olawuyi, and our amiable moderator Dr. Jason McSparren. The topic was one that is long overdue, only to be validated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nigeria as a nation and Africa as a continent has not lived up to its abundance of natural resources. The extractive industries have been bedeviled by corrupt practices and environmental insensitivity. In the age of sustainable development where the environment is unassailable, economic development is non-negotiable and equality is indisputable; what role would the extractive industry play in expediting sustainable development in Nigeria and Africa? Oil is one of the products of the extractive industry, has been the mainstay of our economy, and has enriched public coffers conveniently. How do we transition from this monoculture economic system to a rich multicultural economic system without hemorrhaging the economy?

For satisfactory answers and an in-depth analysis into this mysterious industry, find out more by downloading the audio, video or transcript of the webinar.

See more at:

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Africa Mining Vision (AMV): Policy Tools for Natural Resource-based Development

Jason J. McSparren

The EITI ( – The global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources – is arguably the most prominent global governance intervention applied to the extractive sectors. Since its inception in 2002, the EITI has targeted official corruption and fiscal mismanagement in the extractive sectors by reinforcing democratic norms and strengthening transparency-based procedures to inform civil society about the value of the sector and how that revenue is allocated. As stated in the 2013 EITI Standard,

The objective of the EITI Association is to make the EITI Principles and the EITI Requirements the internationally accepted standard for transparency in the oil, gas and mining sectors, recognising that strengthened transparency of natural resource revenues can reduce corruption, and the revenue from extractive industries can transform economies, reduce poverty, and raise the living standards of entire populations in resource-rich countries.

(EITI International Secretariat 2016)

The EITI has been implemented to various degrees across multiple aspects of the mineral value chain with varying levels of success from country to country. Nonetheless, a country’s experience implementing the EITI Standard ( has produced insight into how the sector operates and where the gaps in governance exist. The EITI can be a valuable tool for decision-makers in host-countries to combat the resource curse, yet it is insufficient to address all of the gaps in regulatory governance across several areas: revenue transfers and allocation, value chain processes, environmental protection, stakeholder relations, and human rights protection. Therefore, linking the EITI with the AMV is a strategy that mutually reinforce the good governance norms embedded in the two policies as well as increases the levels of policy transfer across states and sub-national governing bodies.

The underlying principle of the Africa Mining Vision ( is to encourage a developmental state in Africa. Theoretically, as Mkandawire (2001) notes, there is space for an African ‘variety’ of developmental state. Several differences exist between the Asian variety of developmental state and the African one. This paper highlights one major difference, which is also identified as a major challenge. The developmental state in Africa cannot industrialize along the same path as any other state, or region, has in the history of development since the industrial revolution. African development cannot employ hydrocarbon fuels as the ‘rest’ of the developed and advanced-developing states have. Africa’s future development demands a new path, an eco-friendly one built on clean energy, ecological preservation and conservation.

Table 2. depicts a 2017 list of states and regional economic communities (RECs) that are advancing the AMV to some degree. The table also indicates that a majority of the AMV states are also EITI member states.

Table 2: AMV Member States and Supporting Regional Economic Communities 

Angola (non EITI)Burkina FasoCentral African Republic (suspended from EITI)
ChadRepublic of CongoCote d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of CongoEthiopiaEquatorial Guinea (non-EITI)
Gambia (non-EITI)GhanaGuinea
Kenya (non-EITI)Lesotho (non-EITI)Malawi
MaliMozambiqueNiger (non-EITI)
NigeriaRwanda (non-EITI)Sierra Leone
TanzaniaZambiaZimbabwe (non-EITI)
  Namibia (non-EITI)
Regional Economic Communities
Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)East African Community (EAC)Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) 
(Source: Oxfam 2017, 22; EITI membership is author’s addition)

Map 1 depicts a near contiguous group of African states which make up 26 of the 52-member countries of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI 2019). This fact calls to mind the idea of ‘new regionalisms’ (Shaw, Grant, and Cornelissen 2011; Falk and Jessop 2003) and possibly more relevant, ‘developmental regionalisms’ (Adejumobi and Kreiter 2016; Shaw 2012; Shaw, Cooper, and Chin 2009).

Map 1: EITI Member States (source:

Innovative analysis of varieties of new regionalisms is important to this study because in addition to African states having a regional membership majority in the EITI, Map 2 further promotes the idea by advancing prospective new development corridors across the continent that demand regional partnerships as well as, public-private partnerships (PPPs) and civil society cooperation.

Map 2: Potential Resource-based African Development Corridors

(Source: AMV, Annex 2, AU, Addis Ababa 2009 in United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 2010, 133)

The EITI and the AMV contribute to a future vision of a regionally integrated and technologically advanced African continent.


Adejumobi, Said, and Zebulun Kreiter. 2016. “The Theory & Discourse of Developmental Regionalism.” Lusaka.

EITI. 2019. “EITI Progress Report 2019: Opening Data, Building Trust.” Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 1–32.

EITI International Secretariat. 2016. “The EITI Standard 2016,” no. July: 1–60. STANDARD_11July_0.pdf.

Falk, Richard, and Bob Jessop. 2003. “Theories of New Regionalism.” Theories of New Regionalism, no. January 2014.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2001. “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (3): 289–314.

Oxfam. 2017. “From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the Africa Mining Vision.” Oxfam Briefing Paper.

Shaw, Timothy M., Andrew F. Cooper, and Gregory T. Chin. 2009. “Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications for/from Global Governance?” Politikon 36 (1): 27–44.

Shaw, Timothy M., J. Andrew Grant, and Scarlett Cornelissen, eds. 2011. The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.,+Regionalism&ots=I7G7BdG5sR&sig=76wqKpqmYTTWK1gQ3g6OtPHJMUc#v=onepage&q&f=false.

Shaw, Timothy M. 2012. “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States: ‘Renaissance’ for Whom?” Third World Quarterly 33 (5): 837–51.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 2010. “Minerals and Africa’s Development The International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes,” 1–230.

Developmental State and New Regionalisms in the African Context

The value chains of the African mining sectors underwent structural transformation in the 1980s and increasing in the 90s as western-based mining and energy interests capitalized on the liberal ‘globalization’ era. Perhaps, the Africa Mining Vision plays a role in a realignment of current structures as states maneuver to gain a greater percentage of shared benefit. The tension in this debate over structural change is framed as the equitable capture of additional ‘shared benefit’ which is rebuffed as ‘resource nationalism’ with all of its counter-liberal connotations.

The Africa Mining Vision (AMV) is a pan-African approach to governance of the extractive sectors. It was adopted by Heads of State at the February 2009 African Union Summit as an alternative regional scale policy framework with the purpose of doing business differently by “integrating the broader extractive industry into the local, national, regional and global value chains” (Busia and Akong 2017, 146). The underlying goal of the AMV is to utilize Africa’s mining wealth to move from a historic status as an exporter of cheap raw materials to manufacturer and supplier of knowledge-based services. The AMV embodies the ambitions of a continent to move beyond social challenges of poverty and underdevelopment to build a productive working class that enjoys the modern technological advancements.

The AMV framework consists of seven tenets:

The Africa Mining Vision (AMV) is a decade old and implementation at the state level is not robust. As a result, the anticipated regional mineral development corridors are not yet integrating as seamlessly as once expected. Nonetheless, across the continent domestic and cross border initiatives are in various stages of planning and development.

Mkandawire (2001) was an early thinker about the African democratic developmental state but his formulation preceded current concerns about sustainability. A welcome extension of the developmental state is that of developmental regionalism(s) (Adejumobi and Kreiter 2016; Shaw, Grant, and Cornelissen 2011). In addition to governments, such an effort demands input from mining corporations regarding their corporate social responsibility (CSR) and fiscal strategies plus participation by civil society organizations.

  • Promote good governance;
  • Develop institutional and human capacity;
  • Optimize knowledge and use of minerals;
  • Build local and regional infrastructure;
  • Stimulate economic diversification;
  • Harness the potential of small-scale mining; and
  • Foster transparency and accountability (Oxfam 2017, 8).

The implementation of the African Mining Vision and individual states’ experience with implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a basis for the development of individual country mining visions (CMVs), the initial stage of the AMV. The follow through and fruition of devising a medium to long-term CMV and collaborating with regional partners to expand development opportunities reflect the concepts of ‘developmental state’ and ‘developmental regionalisms.’ African Economic institutions UNECA (2013b, 2013a) and UNDP (2013, 66-74) advocate for the adoption of policies framed in the ‘developmental state’ conceptualization (Mkandawire 2001; Singh and Bourgouin 2013) and UNCTAD (2013, Ch. 4) advocates for the creation of ‘developmental regionalisms.’

The original conceptualization of the developmental state was constructed to explain the socio-economic transformations by several East Asian states in the post-World War II era (Yin-wah 2016; Johnson 1982). The concept correlates with the idea of state-intervention in economic activity through industrial policy, or state-led development. Johnson identifies four defining elements of a developmental state: the existence of (1) a small, inexpensive, elite bureaucracy consisting of the best managerial talents, whose duties would be to identify the industries to be developed and the best means of developing them, (2) a political system conductive for the bureaucracy to take initiatives without interference from vested interests, (3) “market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy”, such as the avoidance of overly detailed laws that constrain administrative creativity and the utilization of public corporations, especially the mixed public-private type, to implement policies in high-risk sectors, and (4) a pilot agency within the bureaucracy that is characterized by internal democracy, functions like a think tank, and has a duty to coordinate industrial policy formulation and implementation (Johnson 1982, 11, 315, 317, 319; in Nwapi and Andrews 2017, 231–32).

The concept of developmental state as it exists in the literature focuses primarily on economic production with no explicit focus on the environment. Potential African developmental states do not have the luxury of ignoring environmental impacts in the way that western industrial societies have since the mid-18th century and the BRICS, Asian Tigers, and others have at the start of the 21th century, especially in the current and post-COVID-19 era. Therefore, the conceptualization of African developmental states can no longer be tethered to neoliberal policy in which government keeps its “hands off business” … and the state is “confined to acting like an umpire and passively watching developments.” This has not helped development in African states (Panford 2017, 162-63). In contrast the Asian developmental state focuses on

Industrial policy, …, [which] requires the state to set the tone and pace for success by rightly searching for, selecting and supporting, when appropriate, “winning” economic sectors, whole industries or even specific firms. Selected firms, sectors or industries receive the full and firm backing of the state’s powerful resources as well as policies and financial guarantees (Panford 2017, n3, 164). 

Whether the Asian developmental state model can be duplicated generally and in Africa specifically has been the topic of much debate[1] in which some see promise (Panford 2017; Shaw 2012; Mkandawire 2001; Nwapi and Andrews 2017). In the context of this analysis of current and prospective structures of the extractive industries in SSA within the context of the pursuit of the AMV and its impacts on accomplishing the SDGs and the challenges posed to development by the climate change crisis, it is worthwhile to consider these features as elements of a potential African developmental state.

The concept of ‘new’ regionalisms extends beyond regional organizations and institutions to include characteristics of “multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity, and non-conformity” that involves “a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions” (Falk and Jessop 2003, 1–2). New regionalism includes relationships between regionalism and the extra-regional environment i.e. globalization. Other considerations include: micro-regions within a state or cross-border, macro-regions, (world regions), which are larger territorial units or sub-systems, between the state and the global system level, and meso-regions which characterize mid-range state or non-state arrangements and processes (Ibid 2003).

Innovations in African regions are manifest in different stages of implementation. Lorenz and Rempe (2013) highlight Africa’s contributions with an innovative range of ‘new regionalisms’ involving a variety of non-state actors such as, the Maputo Corridor, Kgalagadi trans-frontier peace-park to Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)/Dialogue; and from International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and regional cooperation in forums such as, Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (T-FTA) between the Southern Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) (Hansohm 2013) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Hartzenberg 2012).

The AMV Action Plan notes that the environmental and social burdens of mining reduce the benefits of mineral exploitation when these costs are considered. In order to address these adverse impacts, it calls on governments to strengthen the frameworks that govern environmental and social impact assessment, management, and regulation as well as, bolster capacity of regulatory agencies. Corporations are called upon to improve the practice and application of corporate social responsibility, and notes that “there is a proliferation of CSR frameworks, norms and reporting formats—some legislated, but most guidelines are voluntary codes. These myriad sources and frameworks are often uncoordinated and sometimes confusing. It is important therefore to embed CSR in a framework whose responsibilities are clear and is part of a broader social development agenda that has been consultatively developed between government, mining companies and communities. This would strengthen the social license for mining projects” (African Union Commission, 2011, 28).

As states in cooperation with stakeholders implement sustainable development and local content projects, the developmental state framework assists in identifying the characteristics of African variety of developmental state. Furthermore, developmental regionalisms provide insight for analysis of African states and stakeholders as regional linkages evolve to create economies of scale and local content development. The Africa Mining Vision is an outline to pursue complex developmental processes that include structural change. The theories of developmental state and developmental regionalisms may contribute insight for the planning and analysis of this complex restructuring.


Adejumobi, Said, and Zebulun Kreiter. 2016. “The Theory & Discourse of Developmental Regionalism.” Lusaka.

African Union Commission. n.d. “Building a Sustainable Future for Africa’s Extractive Industry: From Vision to Action.” In AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources Development Second Ordinary Session. Addis Ababa.

Busia, Kojo, and Charles Akong. 2017. “The African Mining Vision: Perspectives on Mineral Resource Development in Africa.” Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The) 8, No. 1 (2017): 145-192. 8 (1): 145–92.

Falk, Richard, and Bob Jessop. 2003. “Theories of New Regionalism.” Theories of New Regionalism, no. January 2014.

Hansohm, Dirk. 2013. “South Sudan, Sudan and the East African Community: Potential of Enhanced Relationships.” W-2013/4. UNU-CRIS Wk.Papers. United Nations University.

Hartzenberg, Trudi. 2012. “The Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards a New African Integration Paradigm?” Tralac, Trade Law Centre.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford Univesity Press.

Lorenz, Ulrike, and Martin Rempe. 2013. Comparing Regionalism in Africa: Mapping Agency. Farnham: Ashgate.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2001. “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (3): 289–314.

Nwapi, Chilenye, and Nathan Andrews. 2017. “Recent State Interventions Vis-à-Vis Resource Extraction in Kenya , Tanzania , and Rwanda.” Journal of Sustainable Development 13: 223–67.

Oxfam. 2017. “From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the Africa Mining Vision.” Oxfam Briefing Paper.

Panford, Kwamina. 2017. Africa’s Natural Resources and Underdevelopment: How Ghana’s Petroleum Can Create Sustainable Economic Prosperity. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Shaw, Timothy M., J. Andrew Grant, and Scarlett Cornelissen, eds. 2011. The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.,+Regionalism&ots=I7G7BdG5sR&sig=76wqKpqmYTTWK1gQ3g6OtPHJMUc#v=onepage&q&f=false.

Shaw, Timothy M. 2012. “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States: ‘Renaissance’ for Whom?” Third World Quarterly 33 (5): 837–51.

Singh, Jewellord Nem, and France Bourgouin, eds. 2013. Resource Governance and Developmental States in the Global South: Critical International Political Economy Perspectives. Springer.

UNCTAD. 2013. “Economic Development in Africa: Intra-African Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism: Report 2013.” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, no. July.

UNDP. 2013. Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World. United Nations Development Programme. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

UNECA. 2013a. “Making the Most of Africa’s Commodities: Industrializing for Growth, Jobs and Economic Transformation.”

———. 2013b. “Managing Africa’s Natural Resource Base for Sustainable Growth and Development: Sustainable Development Report on Africa IV.” Addis Ababa.

Yin-wah, Chu. 2016. “The Asian Developmental State: Ideas and Debates.” In The Asian Developmental State: Re-Examinations and New Departures. New York: Palgrave macmillan.

[1] For citations referencing the debate see Nwapi and Andrews 2017, p. 236 n. 55.


States across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are well endowed with natural resources. In many cases, resource-rich[1] African states are economically dependent on the extractive sectors – mining for minerals and metals and drilling for oil and natural gas. According to Kaufmann (2012), extractive-dependent African societies can have as high as 80 percent of their populations living on less than $5 per day, and over 50 percent living on under $2 a day.

Raw commodities are exported to upstream sectors of the global value chains for energy i.e. hydrocarbon fuels and uranium, building materials i.e. lumber and cement, and technological products i.e. computers and batteries. Resource dependence occurs when the extractive sector has an over-sized impact on insufficiently diversified economies.

Despite these natural endowments, states are struggling to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and poverty continues to spread (Beegle et al. 2016). This political economy of energy and raw materials has to be scrutinized for its focus on economic activity at the expense of environmental integrity and human rights protections in mining-industry effected areas.

Balancing of market principles that drive mining corporations to extract and export raw minerals and protecting environmental integrity and human rights in mining-affected communities (MACs) remains a true global governance challenge.

Two competing perspectives about the mining industry exist about its impacts on Africa and across the Global South. The first, is that the industries produce negative socio-economic outcomes which is illustrated by the resource curse phenomena. The second perspective is that the mining sectors provide economic opportunity that has not yet been fully exploited. To better understand the complex dynamics of harmonizing industry and societal dynamics we must explore the global, regional, and domestic contexts of resource-rich African states.  

The resource curse phenomena

Why is it that the overwhelming majority of resource-rich[1] countries are unable to translate revenues into positive development gains for society? The correlation between natural resource-based economies and poor developmental outcomes in host-countries is so pervasive that the phenomenon has earned the inimical nomenclatures, ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl 1997) and ‘resource curse.’

The resource curse takes many forms and states may experience combinations of negative externalities associated with the resource curse. The most common of these include: deficits in democracy, inter-state and intra-state conflicts, inefficient fiscal responsibility – spending  and borrowing, ‘Dutch disease’, patriarchy and gender-based challenges, limited government capture of benefits, weak institutional development and social and environmental problems (NRGI 2015).

 Moreover, the degenerative repercussions from mining creates attitudes of resentment in mining-affected communities where the environment, livelihoods and human health suffer. This resentment holds the potential to escalates into conflict and eventual violence between civil society and mining corporations. In comments on the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the African continent, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that mineral exploitation may be a “path leading to conflict, spiraling inequality, corruption and the failure of state institutions in Africa” (Annan 2012). This results from poor outcomes from natural resource extraction in developing countries, especially those in Africa, that fail to achieve prosperity and socio-economic advancement (Sovacool 2010 in ACBF 2013, 79).

Counter-Argument: Extractive-based Development

To the contrary of what was previously stated, certain economists identify the extractive industries as a good foundation on which a developing state may build an economy. Revenues derived from the extractive sector fund the state-system and domestic reinvestment is perceived as a good strategy for socio-economic development (Lin 2012; African Union 2009; Barma et al. 2012).

While many argue the existence of a ‘curse,’ it is widely believed that, “[n]atural resource endowments can spur development in African countries, if managed appropriately.” However, it is true that “resource exploitation does not automatically translate into meaningful development. Indeed, poor growth rates, high inequality, social exclusion, impoverishment, poor governance, environmental concerns, social tensions, and civil strife characterize many resource-rich countries across Africa and in the developing world” (Paul Collier 2007; Hanson, D’Alessandro, and Owusu 2014, 1). The dichotomy of perspectives as to whether extractive industries pose a threat or an opportunity for states drives the demand for continued research.

Varied experiences of resource-rich economies

The resource curse phenomenon contributes to widespread poverty in resource-rich countries; however, some countries are able to derive sufficient benefit. Norway is regularly presented as an example of a successful extractives-based economy particularly for its success in overcoming ‘Dutch disease’ and revitalizing the economy. Norway’s recovery was made possible through good policy choices, such as making oil wealth is a common-property resource by law. The Norwegian government takes in about 80% of the oil rent through taxes and fees and invests it into foreign securities; this combined with other good policies has turned abundant natural resource riches from a curse to a blessing (Gylfason 2000). In Sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana is an example of a successful resource-rich economy that achieves consistently strong economic growth performance. Like Norway, Botswana’s success is attributed to democratic governance and good policy choices (Good 1992; Harvey and Lewis 1980; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).

Policy choice and implementation stand out as preventative measures against the resource curse. Cameroon, like Norway is an oil exporting state, but in contrast, Cameroon’s economy has been stagnant with an annual average growth rate around 3.5% over the past four decades. In the period between 1977 and 2007, Cameroon’s government captured a sizeable portion of oil rents, but only a third of that revenue was directed to the budget. The remainder, according to official accounts, was “saved” abroad, which is a good strategy as demonstrated by Norway where overseas investment protects the economy from resource-dependence and Dutch disease. Unfortunately for the people of Cameroon, the two-thirds remainder of state revenues cannot be accounted for because it was misappropriated by national leadership (Gauthier and Zeufack 2009). Countries that suffer from the resource curse like Cameroon and Mali are constrained by both structural economic and governance factors.

Analysis of the Mining-Development Nexus

The mining-development nexus is perceived from two generalized perspectives. The resource curse perspective argues that economic structures promote business efficiency at the expense of environmental integrity, human rights protections, and socio-economic development. The alternative viewpoint perceives the mining sector as a source of economic activity that has not yet been fully exploited. There is opportunity for states to develop up-stream and side-stream industries. Furthermore, opportunities exist in creating regional mining development hubs. This debate will be central to my 2020 study titled, Global Governance and Mining in Africa: The Africa Mining Vision as a Framework for Sustainable Developmental Regionalisms?, as well as, subsequent posts at #NaturalResourceGovernanceDiscourse.


Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. “An African Success Story: Botswana.” 3219. London.

African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). 2013. “Capacity Development for Natural Resource Management: African Capacity Indicators 2013.” Harare.

African Union. 2009. “African Mining Vision.”

Annan, Kofi. 2012. “Momentum Rises to Lift Arica’s Curse.” The New York Times, September 14, 2012.

Barma, Naazneen H, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh, and Le Lorena. 2012. Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Beegle, Kathleen, Luc Christiaensen, Andrew Dabalen, and Isis Gaddis. 2016. “Poverty in a Rising Africa.” The World Bank Group.

Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford University Press.

Gauthier, Bernard, and Albert Zeufack. 2009. “Governance and Oil Revenues in Cameroon.” Revenue Watch Project. Oxford.

Good, Kenneith. 1992. “Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana.” Journal of Modern African Studies 30: 69–95.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur. 2000. “Natural Resources, Education and Economic Development.” 2594. London.

Hanson, Kobena T., Cristina D’Alessandro, and Francis Owusu, eds. 2014. Manging Africa’s Natural Resources: Capacities for Development. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Harvey, Charles, and Stephen Jr. Lewis. 1980. Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana. London: MacMillan Press.

IMF. 2012. “Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries: Background Paper 1-Suppliment 1.” Washington D.C.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. London: University of California Press.

Kaufmann, Daniel. 2012. “Poverty in the Midst of Abundance: Governance Matters for Overcoming the Resource Curse.” The Brookings Institute.

Lin, Justin Yifu. 2012. New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

NRGI. 2015. “The Resource Curse: The Political and Economic Challenges of Natural Resource Wealth.” In NRGI Reader. Natural Resource Governance institute.

Sovacool, Benjamin K. 2010. “The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Southeast Asia: Heading towards the Natural Resource Curse?” Pacific Review 23 (2): 225–59.

[1]This classification is based on a country deriving at least 20 percent of exports or 20 percent of fiscal revenue from nonrenewable natural resources (based on 2006 –10 averages) (IMF 2012)